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NOTES 
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE OF REFUSAL 
TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL BREATH TEST FOR 
ALCOHOL ADMISSIBLE ONLY WHEN RELEVANT TO 
MATTERS OTHER THAN DEFENDANT'S INNOCENCE 
OR GUILT. Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 
(1991). 
More than 22,000 Americans, including over 200 Marylanders, 
die every year in alcohol-related automobile accidents. I Maryland's 
legislature has acted to stem this carnage by "enacting a series of 
measures to rid our highways of the drunk driv[ing] menace."2 
Chemical breath analyses3 are one measure that the legislature has 
sanctioned to detect those suspected of driving under the influence 
of alcohol4 or driving while intoxicated.s 
In Krauss v. State,6 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in 
a four-to-three decision7 that evidence of a defendant's refusal to 
submit to breath testing for alcohol is inadmissible when offered to 
prove guilt. 8 The court concluded that evidence of refusal is properly 
admissible only when relevant to a "collateral" matter, such as a 
claim by the defendant that he was not afforded the opportunity to 
take a breath test or that the arresting officer failed to comply with 
the statutory provisions regarding administration of the tesU In thus 
1. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCn., ACCIDENT FACTS 56 (1992). The National Safety 
Council reports that "[a]bout 50 percent of all traffic fatalities in 1990 involved 
an intoxicated or alcohol-impaired driver or non-occupant," resulting in 22,083 
fatalities. [d. "The estimated cost of all alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents 
in 1991 was about $22.2 bilJion." [d. Alcohol related accidents claimed 230 
Marylanders in 1991. Maryland State Police, Dep't of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services, News Release (Jan. 28, .1992). 
2. Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 370, 488 A.2d 171, 175 (1985); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., TRANsp. §§ 16-205 to -205.2 (1992), and MD. CODE ANN., CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. §§ 10-302 to -309 (1992). 
3. Chemical breath tests are performed on a Breathalyzer unit. Both the Breath-
alyzer device and its operator are subject to rigorous standards set by the state 
toxicologist. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-302 to -309 (1992). 
4. See id. § 10-307(d) (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
5. See id. § 10-307(e) (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
6. 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 (1991). 
7. The majority opinion, authored by Judge Orth, was joined by Judges Eldridge, 
Rodowsky, and Thieme. Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 377, 587 A.2d 1102 
(1991). The dissent consisted of Judge McAuliffe, joined by Judges Chasanow 
and Smith. [d. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1109. 
8. [d. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1107-08. 
9. [d. at 386-87, 587 A.2d at 1107. 
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deferring to the legislative mandate, the court declined to embrace 
the national trend towards liberalization of laws governing admissi-
bility of evidence of refusal 10 by adopting an approach that greatly 
restricts the admissibility of such evidence. 
Frank Leroy Krauss's troubles began when he allegedly ran 
another motorist off the road. II Krauss became involved in an 
altercation with the other motorist, and then fled on foot from the 
scene. 12 Krauss was later apprehended by police who "detected the 
odor of alcohol emanating from [him]."13 Krauss was placed under 
arrest and advised of his rights to have a chemical breath test for 
alcohol, which he refused. 14 
Krauss was tried by jury and convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol in the Circuit Court for Cecil County}S Rejecting 
a motion to exclude the evidence of Krauss's breath test refusal, the 
trial judge allowed the jury to hear the evidence, but instructed them 
that the "refusal could not in any way be used against [Krauss] as 
evidence of his guilt. "16 Krauss appealed to the court of special 
appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 17 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment of the court of special 
appeals, remanding the case to the circuit court for retria1. 18 
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the trial judge 
erred in admitting evidence of Krauss's refusal to submit to a chemical 
breath test. 19 To resolve the issue, the court was forced to mesh two 
seemingly inconsistent provisions of section 1O-309(a) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article into a coherent and cogent decla-
ration of the law. 
The court noted in its analysis that, prior to July 1, 1986, Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings section 10-309(a) provided that no inference 
or presumption of guilt or innocence could be drawn from refusal 
10. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
11. Krauss v. State, 82 Md. App. 1,2, 569 A.2d 1284, 1285 (1991). 
12. Id. at 2, 569 A.2d at 1285. 
13. Id. at 3, 569 A.2d at 1285. Krauss had allegedly been drinking at a party on 
the evening of September 3, 1988. Id. at 2-3, 569 A.2d at 1284-85. 
14. Id. at 3, 569 A.2d at 1285. 
15. Id. at 2, 569 A.2d at 1284. 
16. Id. at 7, 569 A.2d at 1287. The trial judge refused Krauss's proposed jury 
instruction which read: 
The only reason you have been permitted to hear evidence concerning 
whether Defendant did not take a breath or blood test is in determining 
whether the police followed the proper procedures upon detaining 
and/or arresting Defendant for the offenses of driving under the 
influence of alcohol and/or driving while intoxicated. 
Id. at 7, 569 A.2d at 1287. 
17. Id. at 9, 569 A.2d at 1287. 
18. Krauss v. State, 322· Md. 376, 390, 587 A.2d 1102, 1109 (1991). 
19. Id. at 382, 587 A.2d at 1105. 
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to submit to a breath test, and evidence of refusal was not admissible 
at trial.20 In 1986, the section was revised, making evidence of refusal 
admissible, but retaining the provision prohibiting presumptions or 
inferences. 21 Krauss argued, and the court agreed, that the statutory 
provision prohibiting inferences or presumptions of guilt or innocence 
could be harmonized with the provision making evidence of refusal 
admissible at trial.22 
The court of appeals noted that the 1986 revision was originally 
intended both to eliminate the prohibition on presumptions and 
inferences and to allow for the admission of evidence of refusal, but 
that amendments during the bill's passage abolished the attempt to 
eliminate the bar on presumptions and inferences.23 In light of the 
conflict between the original draft and the enacted version of the 
bill, the court turned to recognized principles of statutory interpre-
tation to ascertain legislative intent. 24 The court found that the 
legislature clearly "recognized that the mere fact of refusal to take 
the Breathalyzer test was collateral to the issue of [guilt,] ... [b]ut 
... may be material and relevant to collateral matters.' '25 
The court then shifted its focus to an examination of the 
evidentiary requirements for admissibility. To be admissible, evidence 
must be material to the issue for which it is offered,26 and probative 
of the proposition towards which it is directed. 27 Evidence that is 
not material or probative is irrelevant and not admissible.28 
20. [d. at 386. 587 A.2d at 1106. For the text of the pre-1986 version of § 10-
309. see infra note 58. . 
21. [d. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1107. For the text of § 10-309 as amended in 1986. 
see infra note 70. As noted by the Krauss court. see id. at 378 n.l. 587 A.2d 
at 1103 n.l. § 10-309 was subsequently amended in 1989. see 1989 Md. Laws 
2353. and again in 1990. see 1990 Md. Laws 1714. The subsequent amendments 
had no bearing on the court's decision in Krauss. and are not considered in 
this casenote. 
22. [d. at 383-86. 587 A.2d at 1105-06. Counsel for Krauss argued that although 
refusal evidence was made admissible. the inference or presumption clause was 
left in the statute "to give the State an opportunity. and certainly correctly. 
to rebut any allegations that the trooper did anything other than that which is 
provided by statute." [d. at 383. 587 A.2d at 1l05. 
23. [d. at 386. 587 A.2d at 1107. See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. 
Summary of Committee Report: Senate Bill 85 1-2 (1986). 
24. Krauss v. State. 322 Md. 376. 386. 587 A.2d 1102. 1107 (1991). 
25. [d. at 386-87. 587 A.2d at 1107. 
26. As noted by the Krauss court. "[mJateriality looks to the relation between the 
propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case." [d. 
at 387. 587 A.2d at 1107 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185. at 541 
(Edward W. Cleary ed .• 3d ed. 1984». 
27. Probative value is "the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that 
it is offered to prove." [d. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185. at 544 
(Edward W. Cleary ed .• 3d ed. 1984». 
28. Krauss v. State. 322 Md. 376. 387-88. 587 A.2d 1102. 1107-08 (1991). 
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Relating evidentiary considerations to the facts before it, the 
court emphasized that because Krauss was contesting neither the fact 
of his having refused a breath test nor the actions of the police in 
arresfing him, there was no collateral matter in question. 29 Conse-
quently, the evidence of refusal was immaterial, bearing "no proper 
relation to the ... guilt of the accused,"30 and irrelevant, having 
"no proper probative value to establish the guilt of the accused. "31 
The court thus held that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
admitting the evidence.32 The court further held that the admission 
of the evidence of refusal constituted prejudicial error, as they could 
not declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission had not 
influenced the verdict of the jury. 33 
Determining the admissibility of evidence of refusal involves 
consideration of constitutional, statutory, and evidentiary issues.34 
The constitutional issues focus on the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against self-incrimination. 35 
In Schmerber v. Caiijornia,36 the United States Supreme Court 
held that a state could compel the withdrawal of blood for alcohol 
analysis37 and introduce the results of such analysis into evidence. 38 
The Court explained that the Fifth Amendment protects an accused 
against the compulsion of testifying against himself or herself39 or 
otherwise providing the State with testimonial or communicative 
29. Id. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1107. The court indicated that "there appeared no 
sound reason for the State to introduce evidence of the refusal except to 
influence the jury towards a verdict of guilty." Id. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1107-
08. 
30. Id. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1108. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 389, 587 A.2d at 1108. In dicta, the court noted that it did not believe 
that the judge's jury instruction regarding Krauss's refusal served to "disas-
sociate, in the minds of the jurors, the refusal to take the test from the 
question of Krauss's guilt or innocence of the charges." Id. at 389-90, 587 
A.2d at 1108. 
34. 1 DONALD H. NICHOLS, DlUNKINO/DlUVINO LmOATION § 12:02 (1988). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
36. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
37. Id. at 771-72. The Court held that under the circumstances of the case, 
compelling the defendant to provide a blood sample for alcohol analysis did 
not constitute an unlawful search and seizure violative of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Factors which the court considered were that police 
had probable cause to make an arrest for driving while intoxicated, the method 
chosen for determining blood alcohol content was reasonable and effective, 
and the consequences of delay in taking a blood sample left no time to secure 
a warrant. Id. at 766-72. 
38. Id. at 760-65. 
39. Id. at 761. 
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evidence.4O The Fifth Amendment protection does not, however, 
require the exclusion of the "body as evidence when it may be 
material. "41 As a result, "compulsion which makes a suspect or 
accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate [the 
Fifth Amendment]. "42 Compulsory blood withdrawal, though poten-
tially incriminating, demands neither a defendant's testimonial nor 
communicative faculties, and therefore is not proscribed by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
While holding that the state could compel a defendant to undergo 
a chemical test for alcohol, Schmerber left unanswered the "question 
of whether evidence of refusal violate[sJ the privilege against self-
incrimination."43 The Court addressed this question in 1983, in South 
Dakota v. Neville. 44 At issue in Neville was the constitutionality of 
a South Dakota statute allowing suspects to refuse testing to avoid 
confrontations with police, but permitting evidence of refusal to be 
used against the defendant at trial. The Court emphasized that Fifth 
Amendment protections are not triggered in such situations, because 
the State does not compel or coerce suspects to refuse to submit to 
testing.4s The Court further reasoned that, whereas Schmerber grants 
the State a legitimate right to compel a test for alcohol,46 it is "no 
less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the 
test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. "47 
40. Id. 
41. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910). 
42. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
43. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983) (citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966». In Schmerber, a physician was 
directed by a police officer to withdraw Schmerber's blood for alcohol screening 
following an accident. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. The Schmerber holding 
was limited to a finding that it was constitutional for the state to compel a 
suspect to undergo testing and utilize the results at trial. Id. at 760-65. 
The case makes note, however, that Schmerber was requested to take a 
breath test, which he refused. Id. at 765 n.9. Evidence of Schmerber's refusal 
to submit to a breath test was introduced at trial without objection. Id. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Schmerber contended that the admission of such 
evidence constituted grounds for reversal of his conviction. Id. The Court felt 
"general Fifth Amendment principles" would govern the admissibility of 
evidence of refusal, but declined to comment further as they felt that his 
contention was foreclosed due to the lack of a timely objection. Id. 
44. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
45. Id. at 562-63. 
46. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
47. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983). The Court also determined 
that it was not "fundamentally unfair" to use the respondent's refusal as 
evidence of gUilt, even though he was "not specifically warned that his refusal 
could be used against him at trial." Id. at 565. In dicta, however, the Court 
suggested that since the state encourages suspects to submit to testing, it is in 
the state's best interest to fully warn suspects of the consequences of refusal. 
Id. at 566 n.17. 
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A majority of states have enacted statutes, some established as 
a result of Neville,48 expressly permitting evidence of refusal to be 
adduced at trial.49 Only a small minority of states bar the introduction 
of evidence of refusal. so Those states that do bar such evidence do 
48. See 1 NICH01.S, supra note 34, § 21:03. 
49. Jurisdictions that have enacted statutes permitting admission of evidence of 
refusal include the following: Alabama (Ala. Code § 32-5A-194(c) (1989»; 
Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 28.35.032(e) (Supp. 1992»; Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 28-692(1) (Supp. 1992»; California (Cal. Veh. Code § 23157(a)(4) (West 
Supp. 1993»; Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-1202(3)(e) (West 1990»; 
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-227a(f) (West Supp. 1992»; Delaware 
(Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2749 (1985»; Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.1932(1)(a) 
(West Supp. 1993»; Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-392(d) (Supp. 1992»; 
Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95-1/2, para. 11-501.2(c) & 11-501.6(f) (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1992»; Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 9-30-6-3(b) (Burns 1991»; Iowa (Iowa 
Code Ann. § 3211.16 (West Supp. 1991»; Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-
l00I(f)(1) (1991»; Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:666A(3) (West 1993»; 
Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 1312(8) (West Supp. 1992»; Minnesota 
(Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121, subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1993»; Mississippi (Miss. 
Code Ann. § 63-11~41 (1989»; Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 577.041 (Vernon 
Supp. 1992»; Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-404(2) (1991»; Nebraska 
(Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.08(10) (Supp. 1992»; Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 484.389 (Michie 1990»; New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265:88-a 
(Supp. 1992»; New York (N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194(2)(f) (McKinney 
Supp. 1993»; North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a)(3) (1989»; North 
Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-08 (1987»; Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
47, § 756 (West 1988»; Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. § 813.310 (1991»; Pennsylvania 
(75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1547(e) (Supp. 1992»; South Dakota (S.D. Codified 
Laws Ann. § 19-13-28.1 (1987»; Texas (Tex. Rev. Civ., Stat. Ann. art. 67011-
5, § 3(g) (West Supp. 1993»; Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(8) (Supp. 
1992»; Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1202(b) (Supp. 1992»; Washington 
(Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.517 (West Supp. 1993»; Wyoming (Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-6-105(f) (1989». 
50. States prohibiting admission of evidence of refusal include Hawaii, Virginia, 
and Massachusetts. The Hawaii statute provides as follows: 
If a legally arrested person refuses to submit to a test of the person's 
breath or blood, evidence of refusal shall be admissible only in a 
hearing under part XIV of this chapter [relating to administrative 
revocation of licenses] and shall not be admissible in any other action 
or proceeding, whether civil or criminal. 
HAW. REv. STAT. § 286-159 (Supp. 1992). 
Massachusetts law provides that 
[w]hen there is no evidence presented at a civil or criminal proceeding 
of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the defendant's blood, the 
presiding judge at a trial before a jury shall include in his instructions 
to the jury a statement of an arresting officer's responsibilities upon 
arrest of a person suspected to be operating a motor vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol and a statement that a blood alcohol test 
may only be administered with a person's consent; that a person has 
a legal right to take or not take such a test; that there may be a 
number of reasons why a person would not take such a test; that 
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so judicially on the ground that it lacks evidentiary value, SI or by 
means of a statute expressly prohibiting admission. S2 
The State of Michigan is among the minority of states that bar 
admission of evidence of refusal. In People v. Duke,S) a Michigan 
court faced with the challenge of interpreting a statute allowing for 
the admission of evidence of refusal but forbidding the fact-finder 
from using refusal as evidence of guiltS4 held that such evidence was 
inadmissible because it was too prejudicial. 
there may be a number of reasons why such a test was not adminis-
tered; that there shall be no speculation as to the reason for the 
absence of a test and no inference can be drawn from the fact that 
there was no evidence of a blood alcohol test; and that a finding of 
guilty or not guilty must be based solely on the evidence that was 
presented in the case. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1993). But see Com-
monwealth v. Conroy, 485 N.E.2d 180 (Mass. 1985), wherein the combination 
of a trooper testifying that the defendant had been provided with an opportunity 
to take a breathalyzer test, followed by an absence of discussion concerning 
the results or reasons why a test could not be performed, led inferentially to 
the conclusion that the defendant had refused a test. [d. at 182. Distinguishing 
between direct evidence (e.g., the prosecutor asking the trooper whether the 
defendant refused testing) and indirect evidence (e.g., the trooper's brief 
mention that a test was offered, followed by no further discussion of testing), 
the court held that although the evidence should have been excluded, it did 
not constitute reversible error. [d. at 182-83. The court noted that it was not 
opening the door for prosecutors to circumvent the statute in the future because 
its conclusion was based on the inadvertency of the trooper's statement, the 
fact that it was not made as part of a tactical maneuver, and the weight of 
the Commonwealth's evidence. [d. at 183. 
Virginia law provides as follows: 
The failure of an accused to permit a blood or breath sample to be 
taken to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood is not 
evidence and shall not be subject to comment by the Commonwealth 
at the trial of the case, except in rebuttal; nor shall the fact that a 
blood or breath test had been offered the accused be evidence or the 
subject of comment by the Commonwealth, except in rebuttal. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.10 (Michie Supp. 1992). 
51. See discussion of People v. Duke, infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
52. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West Supp. 1992), discussed 
supra note 50. 
53. 357 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
54. [d. at 777. Michigan's statute read: 
(8) If a jury instruction regarding a defendant's refusal to submit to 
a chemical test under this section is requested by the prosecution or 
the defendant, the jury instruction shall be given as follows: 
'Evidence was admitted in this case which, if believed by the jury, 
could prove that the defendant had exercised his or her right to refuse 
a chemical test. You are instructed that such a refusal is within the 
statutory rights of the defendant and is not evidence of his guilt. You 
are not to consider such a refusal in determining the guilt or innocence 
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Acknowledging that ,other states have determined evidence of 
refusal to be probative, the Duke court nonetheless concluded that 
Michigan's statute forbade introduction' of evidence of refusal to 
"prove the elements of the crime. "55 Rather, the introduction of 
such evidence would be limited to rebuttal, and then only when the 
defense "opens the door" to the issue by questioning the police 
officer's competency or credibility. 56 
Admission of evidence of breath test refusal has long been 
prohibited by statute in MarylandY Prior to amendment in 1986,. 
section 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article pro-
vided that "[t]he fact of refusal to submit [to a chemical breath test 
for alcohol] is not admissible in evidence at the trial. "58 The statute 
of the defendant.' 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 257.625a(8) (West Supp. 1983). 
This code section has since been amended. Effective January 1, 1993, the 
section relevant to evidence of refusal reads: 
(10) A person's refusal to submit to a chemical test as provided 
in subsection (6) shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for a 
crime described in section 625c(l) only for the purpose of showing 
that a test was offered to the defendant, but not as evidence in 
determining innocence or guilt of the defendant. The jury shall be 
instructed accordingly. 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 257.625a(lO) (West Supp. 1992). 
55. People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
56. [d. at 777-78. The court held that 
[t]he most obvious examples of circumstances where such evidence 
could be admitted are: 
a. Where the defendant denies being given an opportunity to take 
a breathalyzer test, 
b. Where the defendant claims that he took the test and the 
results were exculpatory, 
c. Where the defendant challenges the competency of any of the 
testing done by the officer, or 
d. When the defendant challenges the credibility of the officer. 
[d. 
57. Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-309 which prohibits the admission of 
evidence of refusal and bars presumptions or inferences arising from refusal, 
was enacted in 1973 and became effective on January 1, 1974. See 1973 Md. 
Spec. Sess. Laws 313-14, 431 (effective Jan. 1, 1974). Article 35, § 100 of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), the predecessor to § 10-309, was enacted 
in 1959. See 1959 Md. Laws 1187-89 (effective June 1, 1959). 
58. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-309 (1984) (emphasis added) (effective 
July 1, 1982) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-
309 (Supp. 1993». The 1984 version of the statute provided in full as follows: 
[Chemical tests for intoxication] - Refusal to submit to test. 
(a) Test not compulsory. - Except as provided in § 16-205.1(c) of 
the Transportation Article, a person may not be compelled to submit 
to a chemical analysis provided for in this subtitle. Evidence of 
chemical analysis is not admissible in a prosecution for a violation of 
§ 21-902 of the Transportation Article if obtained contrary to its 
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further provided that "[n]o inference or presumption concerning 
either guilt or innocence arises because of [the defendant's] refusaf 
to submit. "59 
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. 
Neville, Maryland legislators proposed amending state law to allow 
for the admission of evidence of refusal. 60 Two bills introduced in 
the Maryland Senate in 1983 were intended to amend section 10-309 
to allow for the admission of evidence of refusal.61 Despite vigorous 
support from the law enforcement community62 and favorable Senate 
treatment, neither bill was enacted. Similar efforts by the legislature 
in 198463 and 198564 also failed, but the measure permitting intro-
duction of evidence of refusal finally passed in 1986.65 Notwithstand-
ing the statutory amendment of the code, however, the court of 
appeals' ruling in Krauss leaves Maryland among the minority of 
states that restrict the admissibility of evidence of refusal. 
Forced to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent statutory provi-
sions, the court of appeals sought to balance the legislative directive 
with the principles governing admissibility of evidence.66 In so doing, 
the court noted that the goal of statutory interpretation is to realize 
"a reading of the words employed which is consistent with ordinary 
language use and expresses a rule which [the court] believe[s] the 
legislature intended to enact. "67 As a starting point, therefore, the 
Krauss court examined the legislative history of Senate Bill 85, the. 
passage of which amended section 10-309 in 1986. Although initially 
intended to eliminate restrictions on presumptions or inferences aris-
provIsions. No inference or presumption concerning either guilt or 
innocence arises because of refusal to submit. The fact of refusal to 
submit is not admissible in evidence at the trial. 
Id. (second emphasis added). 
59.Id. 
60. See SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE REpORT SYSTEM OF 
1983, at Parts I-III (1983). 
61. See S. 872, Reg. Sess. (1983); S. 847, Reg. Sess. (1983). Senate Bill 872 sought 
to make the fact of refusal admissible, but retained the bar on inferences and 
presumptions arising from refusal. As originally drafted, S. 847 also sought to 
make the fact of refusal admissible while retaining the bar on inferences and 
presumptions. An amendment to S. 847, however, deleted the provision pro-
hibiting inferences or presumptions arising from a person's refusal to submit 
to a breath test. 
62. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
63. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
65. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. 
66. See Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 385-88, 587 A.2d 1102, 1106-08 (1991). 
67. JIM EVANS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 59 (1988). See also In re Demetrius, 
321 Md. 468, 473-77, 583 A.2d 258, 261-62 (1991), in which the court discussed 
the methodology it follows in divining legislative intent. 
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ing from refusal to submit to a chemical breath test,68 Senate Bill 85 
was amended prior to enactment, resulting in conflicting statutory 
language. In its final form, the bill expressly allowed for the admis-
sion of evidence of refusal,69 but took the "teeth" from such evidence 
by directing that "[n]o inference or presumption concerning either' 
guilt or innocence arises because of refusal to submit. ' '70 
Analysis of the history of the breath test admissibility reform 
efforts sheds light on the impetus underlying the amendment of 
Senate Bill 85 and its companion, House Bill 757. Shortly after the 
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in South Dakota v. Neville,71 Senate 
Bill 847 was introduced in the Maryland Legislature.72 Interestingly, 
when first introduced, Senate Bill 847 merely deleted the word "not" 
from Courts and Judicial Proceedings section 10-309.73 Thus the 
statute, the purpose of which was to "provide that the fact of refusal 
to submit to a chemical analysis is admissible in evidence at a trial, "74 
was to read" [t]he fact of refusal is admissible," while the restriction 
on presumptions and inferences was to remain. 75 This appears to 
indicate that, at least initially, the drafters did not view the retention 
of the restriction on presumptions and inferences as an impediment 
to the introduction of evidence of refusal. Apparently having noticed 
68. SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE, SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE REPORT: 
SENATE BILL 85 at I (1986). This report provides in pertinent part: "Changes 
Made By The Bill: This bill eliminates the provision of current law that no 
inference or presumption arises because of refusal to submit to a chemical 
analysis, and makes the fact of refusal to submit admissible in evidence at the 
trial." [d. 
69. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-309(a) (Supp. 1986) provided that 
"[t]he fact of refusal to submit is admissible in evidence at the trial." 
70. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-309 (1989) (effective July I, 1986) 
(current version at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-309 (Supp. 
1993». The 1986 version of the statute provided in full as follows: 
[Chemical tests for intoxication] - Refusal to submit to test. 
(a) Test not compulsory. - Except as provided in § 16-205.I(c) of 
the Transportation Article, a person may not be compelled to submit 
to a chemical analysis provided for in this subtitle. Evidence of 
chemical analysis is not admissible in a prosecution for a violation of 
§ 21-902 of the Transportation Article if obtained contrary to its 
provisions. No inference or presumption concerning either guilt or 
innocence arises because of refusal to submit. The fact of refusal to 
submit is admissible in evidence at the trial. 
[d. (second emphasis added). 
71. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
72. S. 847, Reg. Sess. (1983). 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. S. 847, Reg. Sess. (1983) (version of bill as drafted on Feb. 21, 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
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the possibility of evidentiary problems, Senate Bill 847 was amended 
by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee to delete the restriction 
on presumptions and inferences.76 
The bill was supported by the Maryland State Police77 and the 
Maryland Chiefs of Police Association,78 which felt that "enactment 
of this legislation would be in the public interest in that it would 
assist in efforts to rid our highways of drunken drivers. "79 Although 
the bill received a favorable vote in the Senate, it was killed upon 
reaching the House of Delegates. 80 
The key factor to consider regarding Senate Bill 847 was the 
amendment added by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. 
This suggests that the legislature was expressly aware of the potential 
conflict between the admissibility provision and the presumption and 
inference provision of section 10-309.81 Curiously, despite the 1983 
amendment and a proposal from the Maryland State's Attorneys' 
Association to the contrary,82 when the bill was re-introduced in 1984 
as Senate Bill 474, the restriction on presumptions and inferences 
was left in place.83 As with Senate Bill 847, Senate Bill 474 was 
intended to "provide that a person's refusal to submit to a chemical 
test for intoxication [could] be introduced into evidence";84 the goal 
76. S. 847, Reg. Sess. (1983) (as amended by the Senate Judicial Proceedings 
Committee). See also SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITrEE, SUMMARY OF 
COMMITrEE REPORT: SENATE Bn.L 847, Part I, at 1 (1983) ("As amended, the 
bill also strikes the provision of the present law that no inference of guilt or 
innocence can be drawn from the fact of refusal to submit. "). 
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, by a vote of eight to zero, 
gave S.847, as amended, a favorable recommendation on March 21, 1983. 
The bill then passed on third reader in the Senate on March 28, 1983, by a 
vote of 43 to O. 
77. See Letter from Colonel William T. Travers, Superintendent, Maryland State 
Police, to Senator Thomas V. "Mike" Miller, Jr., Chairman, Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee (Mar. 18, 1983), micr%rmed on S. 847 Legislative 
History File (1983). 
78. See Letter from H. Edgar Lentz, Chairman, Joint Legislative Committee, 
Maryland Chiefs of Police Association, to Senator Thomas V. "Mike" Miller, 
Jr., Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 15, 1983), micro-
formed on S. 847 Legislative History File (1983). 
79. [d. 
80. See House Judiciary Committee Vote Tally, S. 847 (Apr. 7, 1983) (unfavorable 
motion for S. 847). House Bill 391, 1983 Sess. of Maryland Legislature, ~as 
intended to make the fact of refusal admissible. The bill received an unfavorable 
vote in the House Judiciary Committee on March 22, 1984. 
81. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
82. Maryland State's Attorneys' Association Proposed Bill #14 (proposing amend-
ment to Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-309(a», micr%rmed on S. 474 
Legislative History File (1984). 
83. S. 474, Reg. Sess. (1984). 
84. SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITrEE, SUMMARY OF COMMITrEE REPORT: 
SENATE Bn.L 474 at 1 (1984). 
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was "to lower the number of people refusing to take the test. "85 
Although Senate Bill 474 received a favorable vote from the Senate,86 
it too was rejected by the House.87 
In 1985, Senate Bill 54 and companion House Bill 660, both of 
which set out to make evidence of refusal admissible and eliminate 
the restriction on presumptions and inferences, were introduced.88 
Despite support from the Maryland State Police, Baltimore County 
Police, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Maryland State's Attorneys' 
Association, and Judge Charles. E. Moylan, Jr. of the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland,89 the companion bills failed in the 
House,9O seemingly cementing the House bias against this type of 
legislation. 
In 1986, similar legislation was introduced for the fourth con-
secutive year, in the form of Senate Bill 85 and companion House 
Bill 757.91 At the outset, both bills provided that evidence of refusal 
was to be admissible, and that the restriction on presumptions or 
inferences was to be eliminated.92 On February 27, Senate Bill 85 
passed the Senate on third reader by a vote of forty to one.93 
Interestingly, although many agencies ardently supported this 
legislation,94 the Bar Association of Baltimore City strongly opposed 
85. [d. 
86. Senate Bill 474 passed on third reader in the Senate on March 29, 1984, by a 
vote of 42 to 2, with three members not voting. 
87. Senate Bill 474 was rejected by the House Judiciary Committee on April 3, 
1984. Four similar bills were introduced in the House in 198~. House Bill 1115, 
which provided that evidence of refusal was to be admissible, was withdrawn 
due to a drafting error. See Letter from' Joseph Lutz, Delegate, Harford 
County, to Joseph Owens, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 15, 
1984), micr%rmed on H.D. 1115 Legislative History File (1984). 
House Bill 638, which was intended to repeal the restrictions on presump-
tions and inferences and make the fact of refusal admissible, received an 
unfavorable vote in the House Judiciary Committee on March 22, 1984. House 
Bills 192 and 391, both intended to make the fact of refusal admissible, were 
also rejected by the House Judiciary Committee on March 22, 1984. 
88. See S. 54, Reg. Sess. (1985); H.D. 660, Reg. Sess. (1985). 
89. See List of Proponents and Transcript of Public Hearing Held on Feb. 19, 
1985 Before the House Judiciary Committee, micr%rmed on H.D. 660 Leg-
islative History File (1985). As noted in the transcript of the hearing, Judge 
Moylan indicated that the law barring introduction of evidence of refusal was 
based on an assumption that such a bar was required by the Constitution, but 
that the Supreme Court's decision in Neville proved this assumption invalid. 
[d. 
90. See House Judiciary Committee Vote Tally, H.D. 660 (Mar. 22, 1985). 
91. See S. 85, Reg. Sess. (1986); H.D. 757, Reg. Sess. (1986). 
92. See S. 85, Reg. Sess. (1986); H.D. 757, Reg. Sess. (1986). 
93. Maryland State Senate, S. 85, 3rd Reading (Feb. 27, 1986). Forty members 
voted in favor of the bill, six members did not vote, and only one member, 
Senator Winegrad, voted against the bill. [d. 
94. Representatives from the Maryland State Police, Baltimore County Police, 
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the passage of the bill. In a letter dated March 12, 1986, the president 
of the city bar association wrote to the chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, stating that the association opposed the bill 
because it "would allow an adverse inference to be drawn from the 
refusal of a criminal defendant to submit to a chemical test for 
alcohol and would allow for the admission of such refusal into 
evidence at trial,"9s thus having a "chilling effect on the exercise of 
the right against self-incrimination."96 The letter further suggested 
that "the bill may be unconstitutional."97 
Shortly after the date of this letter, the House Judicial Proceed-
ings Committee amended Senate Bill 85 and House Bill 757, rein-
corporating the restriction on presumptions and inferences.98 Senate 
Bill 85, as amended, then passed in the House by a vote of ninety 
to twenty-eight, and in the Senate by a vote of forty-two to zero. 
The tortured history of proposals, amendments, Senate successes, 
and House failures seems to indicate a House bias against this type 
of legislative reform. Furthermore, recognizing that the legislature 
had, in 1983, apparently detected an inconsistency caused by changing 
the admissibility clause but retaining the restriction on presumptions 
or inferences,99 it is possible that the House Judiciary Committee's 
amendment was intended to be ambiguous. Despite the ambiguity, 
the Krauss decision was not unprecedented, however, as a similar 
outcome could have been predicted by analyzing three indicators. 
First, the decision directly accords with the 1984 decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Duke. JOO In Duke, the 
Maryland State's Attorneys' Association, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
appeared in favor of S. 85 at the hearing on February 13, 1986. See Senate 
of Maryland, Judicial Proceedings Committee, Speakers and Appearances, S. 
85, Chemical Test for Alcohol-Refusal-Admissibility (Feb. 13, 1986). 
The same agencies were represented at the hearing for House Bill 757, 
held on February 25, 1986. See House of Delegates, House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Speakers and Appearances, H.D. 757, Chemical Test for Alcohol-
Refusal-Admissibility (Feb. 25, 1986). 
95. Letter from James S. Maffitt, Esq., President, The Bar Association of Balti-
more City, to Joseph E. Owens, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 
12, 1986), micr%rmed on S. 85 Legislative History File (1986). 
96. [d. 
97. [d. Several months later, Attorney General Stephen Sachs wrote Governor 
Harry Hughes that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court has upheld legislation even 
more far-reaching than Senate Bill 85/House Bill 757, we cannot say that this 
legislation is unconstitutional." Letter from Maryland Attorney General Ste-
phen Sachs to Governor Harry Hughes, at 1 (May 16, 1986) micr%rmed on 
S. 85 Legislative History File (1986). 
98. See House Judiciary Committee, Amendments to House Bill No. 757 (First 
Reading File Bill) (Adopted by the House on Mar. 19, 1986); House Judiciary 
Committee, Amendments to Senate Bill No. 85 (Third Reading File Bill). 
99. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
100. 357 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
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court construed the analogous Michigan statute, which permitted the 
admission of evidence of refusal, but forbade the fact-finder from 
using refusal as evidence of guilt. 101 The court concluded that, under 
that state's statute, "evidence of the refusal may not be admitted to 
prove the elements of the crime. "102 The Krauss court did not mention 
Duke in its opinion, but certainly knew of its existence, as it was 
prominently mentioned in Krauss' appellate brief. 103 
Second, Attorney General Stephen Sachs, in a letter to then-
Governor Harry Hughes, addressed the constitutionality and legal 
sufficiency of Senate Bill 85 and companion House Bill 757. 104 
Although Attorney General Sachs said that, in light of Neville, the 
legislation could not be said to be unconstitutional, lOS he stated that 
"it seems difficult to imagine how such evidence could be relevant 
in a case except as an inference of guilt."I06 Furthermore, the 
Attorney General added that "retention in the law of the restriction 
on the inference that arises from the refusal to take the test appears 
to be at odds with the purpose of this legislation in making the 
evidence admissible." 107 
Third, three years prior to Krauss, in NasI v. Lockett,108 the 
court of appeals held that evidence of refusal is admissible in civil 
cases, where section 10-309 does not apply.l09 The court stated in 
10 1. [d. at 776-77. The court of appeals outlined the relevant legislative history as 
follows: 
Prior to 1967, MCL 257.625a; MSA 9.2325(1) provided: 
(4) The person charged shall be advised of his right to refuse to 
take any test provided for in this act and the refusal on the part of 
any person to submit to any such test shall not be admissible in any 
criminal prosecution relating to driving a vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. 
That section was amended by 1967 PA 153 to read: 
(4) The person charged shall be advised that his refusal to take 
a test as herein provided shall result in the suspension or revocation 
of his operator's or chauffeur's license or his operating privilege. 
[d. at 776 (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS § 257.625a). The statute has since been 
extensively revised. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 257.625a (West Supp. 
1993). 
102. [d. at 777. The court indicated that the statute permits introduction of evidence 
of refusal in order to rebut a defense founded on improper administration of 
the test. [d. at 777-78. 
103. Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 
(1991) (No. 42). 
104. Sachs, supra note 97. 
lOS. [d. at 1. 
106. [d. at 1-2. 
107. [d. at 2. 
108. 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d 1113 (1988). 
109. [d. at 369, 539 A.2d at 1126. Although the central holding of Nast, regarding 
the standard applicable to the award of punitive damages in non-intentional 
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Nasi that refusal "tends to show a person's state of mind, "110 which, 
though not rising to the level of a presumption, "enables a reasonable 
inference that the person was aware that he was not sober ... [and] 
tends to show that he was reluctant to have evidence pertaining to 
the actual extent of his impairment ascertained." 11 I 
In light of the court's recognition that, in civil cases, evidence 
of refusal gives rise to a "reasonable inference" that the defendant 
believed himself not to be sober, it would not be unreasonable to 
presume that the fact finder would draw the same inference in the 
criminal setting. This factor, in conjunction with the express words 
of section 10-309, weighs against admitting evidence of refusal. ll2 
Forced to balance the conflicting statutory provisions, the court 
of appeals in Krauss was, in reality, balancing conflicting legislative 
agendas. Perhaps realizing this conflict, the court interpreted the law 
in a manner that maintains the status quo, thereby burdening the 
legislature with the responsibility of effecting any desired change. 
Despite the decision's failure to reflect the twin goals of the 
statute's drafters, i.e., both allowing evidence of refusal to be ad-
missible and concomitantly "permitting" whatever inferences or pres-
umptions that arise therefrom to playa role in the verdict, Krauss 
nonetheless serves to clarify the operation of the statute. The decision 
essentially maintains the status quo, in that evidence of refusal 
continues to be excluded under most circumstances. 
The decision will still likely have some impact upon several 
phases of the justice system. Prior to conductfng breath tests, police 
officers in Maryland are required to read suspected drunk drivers a 
tort cases, has been overruled, see Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 
420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992), the proposition for which Nast is cited 
herein is still valid. 
110. 312 Md. at 369, 539 A.2d at 1126. 
111. [d. In the first edition of his treatise, Maryland Evidence Handbook, Judge 
Joseph Murphy wrote, "My favorite piece of legislation is found in C.J. 10" 
309," JOSEPH F. MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 520, at 204 (1st 
ed. 1989). Judge Murphy added: 
[d. 
At one time the refusal to submit to such a test was inadmissi-
ble, ... Nobody can take issue with the legislature's right to change 
the law, but if "No inference concerning either guilt or innocence 
arises," how come "the fact of refusal" is admissible? 
The quick answer seems to be that the jury should know that the 
defendant was not denied the opportunity to prove his innocence by 
taking the test, Is it re~listic to assume, however, that the jurors will 
avoid drawing the conclusion discussed by Judge Orth in Nast? 
112. Judge Murphy begged the question when he asked, "Is it realistic to assume 
... that jurors will avoid drawing the conclusion discussed by Judge Orth in 
Nast?" MURPHY, supra note 111, § 520, at 204. 
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form delineating their rights. 1I3 This "advice of rights" provides that 
"[t]he results of such test or a refusal of such test may be admissible 
as evidence in any criminal prosecution. "114 Based upon the Krauss 
holding, this warning may be subject to attack since it arguably 
misleads suspects into believing that the state, regardless of whether 
any collateral matters are at issue, may introduce evidence of breath 
test refusal. 
As the public becomes more aware that evidence of refusal is 
unlikely to be introduced, the number of persons submitting to testing 
will probably decrease. However, the drunk driving suspect who 
refuses to submit to testing may still be convicted, since a "chemical 
113. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (1992 & Supp. 1993) serves as the 
statutory basis for this requirement. 
114. Maryland Advice of Rights Form. The Advice of Rights provides in pertinent 
part: 
YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE / PRIVILEGE WILL BE SUSPENDED 
By law, any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor 
vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the 
public in general in this State is deemed to have consented with certain 
limitations, to take a test of breath or a test of blood to determine 
the alcohol concentration of the person's breath or blood, or a blood 
test to determine drug or controlled dangerous substance content. 
You are hereby advised that you have been stopped or detained 
and that reasonal?le grounds exist to believe that you have been driving 
or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, while under 
the influence of alcohol .... 
Under Maryland law, the test to be administered, at no cost to 
you, shall be the test of breath .... 
The results of such test or a refusal of such test may be admissible 
as evidence in any criminal prosecution. 
You have the right to refuse to submit to the test. Your refusal 
shall result in an administrative suspension of your Maryland driver's 
license or your driving privilege if you are a non-resident. The sus-
pension by the Motor Vehicle Administration shall be 45 days for a 
first offense and 90 days for a second or subsequent offense .... 
If you refuse the test or submit to a test which indicates an 
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the Motor Vehicle Adminis-
tration shall be notified, your Maryland driver's license shall be 
confiscated, an Order of Suspension issued, and a temporary license 
issued which allows you to continue driving for 45 days or until a 
hearing is completed, whichever occurs first. 
I have read or have been read the Advice of Rights for a test 
and have been advised of administrative sanctions that shall be im-
posed for refusal to take a test or for a test result indicating an 
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. I understand that this requested 
test is in addition to any preliminary tests that were taken. 
Having been so advised, do you now agree to submit to a test? 
(This is not an admission of guilt). 
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analysis is not a prerequisite to a conviction. HilS Evidence such as 
demeanor, witness observations, and odor of alcohol can support a 
finding that a defendant was intoxicated. 1I6 Moreover, those who 
refuse testing will face the administrative penalties of refusal, includ-
ing the threat of license suspension.1I7 
In the wake of Krauss, defense attorneys will be forced to 
perform a balancing test before asserting defenses challenging collat-
eral matters. 1I8 More often than not, the defense attorney will stip-
ulate that the police officer followed proper procedure in conducting 
the traffic stop and subsequent drunk driving investigation, for doing 
otherwise will open the door to the introduction of evidence that the 
defendant refused a breath test. 
In Krauss v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
communicated its interpretation of section 1O-309(a) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article. The court reached a logical conclu-
sion in analyzing an internally inconsistent statute. Nevertheless, the 
decision places Maryland among the minority of jurisdictions which 
greatly limit the admissibility of evidence of refusal to submit to 
breath testing. 
Howard S. Cohen 
115. State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 539-40, 474 A.2d 898, 904 (1984). 
116. Major v. State, 31 Md. App. 590, 358 A.2d 609 (1976). 
117. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (1992 & Supp. 1993). 
118. Examples of such challenges include claims that no opportunity was afforded 
the defendant to take a breath test, that the defendant actually took the test 
and the results were exculpatory, or questioning the credibility or competency 
of the police officer. People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984). See also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Admissibility In Criminal 
Case of Evidence That Accused Refused To Take Test Of Intoxication, 26 
A.L.R.4th 1112, 1119-22 (1983). 
